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COMMENT
REFLECTIONS ON
THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY: CONTRAVENTION OF
PRECEDENT AND PUBLIC OPINION
Kim A. Lechner*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1988 the juvenile homicide rate exceeded ten percent of
total homicides.' Although a number of factors, including
childhood poverty, child abuse, drug abuse (parental and child), and
the availability of guns, may explain the increase in juvenile violent
crime, no single reason emerges as the precipitating factor. The
tragedy surrounding murder is not diminished by the fact that a
homicide may have been committed by a juvenile offender. While
it may serve some retributive function, executing children for their
crimes does not provide an answer to increasing juvenile homicide
rates.
Currently thirty-eight states permit capital punishment. Of
these thirty-eight states, twenty allow the death penalty to be used
on juvenile offenders. Nine states have no minimum age at which
a juvenile may be sentenced to capital punishment and three states
* The author is a 1996 cum laude J.D. from Marquette University Law
School. Recipient of the 1996 Dean's Pro Bono Award, she is a member of
the Family Law Section of the Wisconsin State-Bar Association, member of
the Christian Legal Society, and an independent contractor with the National
Committee on Crime and Delinquency.
I CHARLES P. EwING, KIDs WHO KILL 169 (1990).
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set the minimum at age fourteen or fifteen.2 The most recent
Supreme Court ruling on the constitutionality of the juvenile death
penalty, Stanford v. Kentucky,3 upheld a Kentucky statute allowing
the practice by deferring to the Kentucky State Legislature to gauge
public sentiment. Child welfare advocates can utilize Stanford's
disregard of precedent established in prior death penalty decisions,
as well as legislative and other considerations, to weaken the
Court's foundation of support for future challenges to juvenile death
penalty statutes.
II. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT AND THE DEATH PENALTY
The Eighth Amendment prohibition of "cruel and unusual
punishment" controls the constitutionality of the Supreme Court's
analysis of capital punishment.4 For almost 100 years, Eighth
Amendment issues have turned on the question of proportionality,
(i.e., whether the severity of the punishment fits the severity of the
crime, and the mental state of the actor).'
To set proportional levels of punishment in the Post World
War II Era, the Court relied on what it called "contemporary norms
of society."6 For thirty years prior to Stanford, the Supreme Court
determined what forms and under what circumstances capital
punishment would be acceptable to the public by analyzing jury
sentencing trends, state laws, and norms of international law.
2 STATE OF WISCONSIN LEGIs. REFERENCE BUREAU, BULL. 95-1, CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT IN WISCONSIN AND THE NATION, 26 (1995).
3 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (4-1-4 plurality) (majority holding death penalty for 16
and 17-year-old offenders constitutional).
4 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
' Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 280 (1983).
6 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
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Stanford rejected this established mode of analysis.
Considering the long line of death penalty cases decided before it,
Stanford can be seen as an aberration.
A. "Evolving standards of decency" 7
Recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on applying the Eighth
Amendment to the imposition of the death penalty has turned on an
assessment of whether such punishment is disproportional to the
crime and, therefore, cruel and unusual. In Trop v. Dulles, the
Court considered any practice in contravention of "evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society"
cruel and unusual. In developing these standards, the Court turned
to several indicators of public opinion, among them state legislation
and jury sentencing trends.
Applying the Trop standard in Furman v. Georgia,9 the
Court struck down a Georgia statute which gave unguided
discretion to juries to impose the death penalty.' ° The Furman
Court ruled that states had to impose guidelines on sentences and
delineate factors to consider when imposing the sentence, thus
initiating a five-year moratorium on the use of the death penalty.
During this five-year period, states worked to enact legislation that
would satisfy the requirements of Furman by choosing one of two
legislative models. Many states sought to impose a system of
"guided discretion" on juries by limiting the classes of death-
eligible crimes and creating a system to evaluate aggravating and
7 Trop, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
8 Id. at 101.
9 408 U.S. 238, 242 (1972) (5-4 decision).
10 Id.
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mitigating factors. Other states eliminated discretion altogether and
passed mandatory death penalty legislation for enumerated crimes."
Upholding a post-Furman Georgia death penalty statute in
1976, the Supreme Court held that the death penalty is not a per se
violation of the Eighth Amendment. 2 Persuasive to the Court was
Georgia's provision for a bifurcated procedure. Following this
procedure, the jury heard additional evidence before deciding to
impose the death penalty and was instructed to consider both
aggravating and mitigating factors,13 including the age of the
defendant.' 4
Two years later, in Lockett v. Ohio,15 the Court cemented its
commitment to "guided discretion" 16 by striking down an Ohio
death penalty statute because it did not permit the type of
individualized consideration of mitigating factors required by the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The rule in Lockett now
controls further determination of the validity of specific death
penalty statutes: a sentencer in capital cases must be permitted to
consider any relevant mitigating factors,' 7 including the age of the
offender.
, See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-180, 181 n.23 (1976) (listing state
statutes).
12 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169.
13 Id. at 173; see GEORGiA CODE ANN. § 26-1101 (1972).
14 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198.
1s 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
16 See Scott E. Sundby, The Lockett Paradox: Reconciling Guided Discretion
and Unguided Mitigation in Capital Sentencing, 38 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1147
(1991).
17 Locket, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
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B. Limitations Regarding Juveniles under the Eighth
Amendment
After the Court abandoned its per se prohibition on capital
punishment, it was widely believed that the Court would be
reluctant to uphold a death penalty statute applicable to minors.
This belief was signaled by the Court's deference to popular
sentiment regarding mitigating factors when setting the severity of
punishment for a particular offense. Eddings v. Oklahoma18 was the
first juvenile capital case to come before the Court. While the
Court did not address whether the death penalty as applied to a
juvenile (in this case a sixteen-year old) was per se unconstitutional,
it did vacate the youth's death sentence because it found that the
sentencing court failed to meet Lockett's mandate. Specifically, the
sentencing court failed to take into account relevant mitigating
factors besides age, in particular, the youth's upbringing and
development. 19
The Supreme Court squarely faced the issue of the juvenile
death penalty in two subsequent cases decided within a year of each
other. These decisions mark opposing determinations of the
constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty. In Thompson v.
Oklahoma,' the Court reversed the death sentence of a fifteen-year
old offender. Relying on Trop's "evolving standards of decency,"
the trends in legislative enactments, 21 jury behavior, and "the views
. . . expressed by- respected professional organizations, -by other
" 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (reversing and remanding).
19 Id. at 104, 116 (acknowledging that the "age of a minor is itself a relevant
mitigating factor of great weight.").
20 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
2 Id. at 829 ("When we confine our attention to the 18 States that have expressly
established a minimum age in their death-penalty statutes, we find that all of them
require that the defendant have attained at least the age of 16 at the time of the
capital offense.").
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nations that share our Anglo-American heritage, and by the leading
members of the Western European community,"' the Thompson
court held that the death penalty as applied to a fifteen-year old was
unconstitutional.2 3
A year later, the Court decided Stanford v. Kentuck 4 by a
four-one-four plurality. Stanford affirmed death sentences of two
youthful offenders - a sixteen-year old and a seventeen-year old --
holding that the petitioners failed to carry their "heavy burden" of
establishing a national consensus showing disapproval of the death
penalty for juveniles over the age of sixteen.'3
The Stanford Court analyzed the same statistical data
regarding state legislation and jury sentencing used in Thompson,
but reached the opposite conclusion. 6 The Thompson dissenters,
now the authors of the Stanford plurality, surveyed state legislation
and found no national consensus existed against the death penalty
for minors. Although capital sentencing of juveniles was rare, the
Stanford plurality opined that this rarity of juvenile death sentences
was not indicative of a rejection of the punishment, rather it was the
result of infrequent egregious homicides committed by juveniles.
2 Id. at 831.
1 Additionally, the Court considered the culpability of the offender in terms of
the juvenile mind and its unique position in the process of human psychological
development. Juveniles were found to have a less developed and rational thought
process than adults. Penological theories of deterrence and retribution -- their
goals to punish the rational person for criminal behavior -- were, therefore,
determined inapplicable to juveniles.
24 Stanford, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
2 Id. at 373 (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 175).
2 This curious result can be explained by examining Justice O'Connor's
concurrence in Thompson. O'Connor confined her concurrence to the facts in
Thompson, convinced the sentence of execution was cruel and unusual because
Oklahoma failed to set a minimum age at which a defendant could be sentenced
to death. Apparently, O'Connor was persuaded by the legislatures' deliberations
in Stanford - because the legislature considered at what age the penalty was
appropriate, deference was due that decision.
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The absence of a minimum age in some capital punishment statutes
was not the result of an oversight by state legislators; rather, the
Court found it to be a deliberate choice to permit the execution of
juvenile offenders. According Justice Scalia, who wrote for the
plurality, current standards of decency are best reflected in
legislation.27 Therefore, the existence of statutes providing for
capital punishfiaent of minors provide sufficient evidence to satisfy
the Trop standard.
Based on Eddings, Thompson, and Stanford, it is clear that
there is no legal bar to the execution of juvenile offenders.
Eddings requires that all mitigating evidence, including age and
youth, be considered in sentencing?28 Thompson seems to allow for
a substitution of the Court's judgment if a legislature fails to set a
minimum age at which an offender can be executed,29 and Stanford
approves the execution of offenders sixteen and older at the time of
the crime because that age is set by a state legislature.
1H. LEGISLATIVE CONSIDERATIONS IN JUVENIE DEATH PENALTY
ENACTMENT
Although the juvenile death penalty has been held
constitutional, there are many other relevant issues which demand
consideration before a legislative body enacts a juvenile death
penalty statute. These issues include juvenile reasoning capacity,
the goals of punishment, the goals of juvenile justice, the state as
parens patriae, and public opinion.
27 Thompson, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
2 Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115-17.
29 Thompson, 487 U.S. at 857-58, (O'Connor, J., concurring).
119
IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
A. Juvenile Reasoning and Emotional Maturity
Juvenile thinking is characterized by a false sense of power
and impaired judgment which can lead to outrageous acts of
violence. Consequential thinking is not carried out among juvenile
murderers, as evidenced by the fact that most murders committed
by this group are unplanned.' Adolescents are more impulsive and
less self-disciplined than adults. It can be reasonably asserted,
therefore, that most juvenile offenders do not weigh the death
penalty when acting impulsively or from fear or surprise.
Death, their own and other's, is not relevant to an
adolescent. Death as a deterrent to behavior is invalid among
adolescents because they lack a personal grasp of death.3 ' Heath
Wilkins, a juvenile murderer, wanted (and received) the death
penalty over life imprisonment stating, "one I fear, the other I
don't. 32
In 1987, ninety-two percent of juvenile offenders on death
row who had been convicted on felony murder charges had no
specific intent to commit murder at the time of the crime. 3 Most
juvenile murders occur without the necessary mens rea because
unexpected circumstances arise while the felony is in progress. The
youthful perpetrator panics and reacts suddenly and irresponsibly.
The Supreme Court has recognized psychological and
behavioral differences between adults and minors. In Bellotti v.
Baird,' the Court observed that "during the formative *years of
childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience,
perspective, and judgment" of adults. The Eddings Court, relying
30 Id. at 864.
31 Id.
32 Stanford, 492 U.S. at 400 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
33 James R.P. Ogloff, The Juvenile Death Penalty: A Frustrated Society's
Attempt For Control, 5 BEHAv. Scr. & L. 447, 452 (1987).
34 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979).
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partly on a report indicating that juveniles deserve less punishment,
stated that age is more than chronological, but also "a time and
condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to
influence and to psychological damage."3s Although crimes
committed by juveniles may be as harmful to victims as those
committed by adults, juveniles may have reduced capacity for self-
control or for long-range thinking.
A recent line of cases also indicates that the Court presumes
minors are less capable of making important decisions than adults.'
In these decisions, the Court recognizes the particular vulnerability
of children, as well as their inherent inability to function in the
same responsible manner as adults.
Despite these Court decisions, a growing body of literature
among social scientists suggests that by the age of fourteen, most
minors have basically the same ability to understand and reason
about long term decisions as adults.38 This research, used by capital
punishment supporters to bolster a bright-line age for the death
penalty, is erroneously relied upon for several reasons. The ability
to make long-term decisions occurs only when the adolescent can
take time to deliberate. As mentioned above, most juvenile
homicides are spontaneous events, committed without premeditation
or consideration of the consequences.
Even if one argues that adolescents possess reasoning skills
equal to adults, a lack of experience as a framework for decision
making results in different conclusions between the adolescent and
the adult. Because of their lack of experience, adolescents act more
irresponsibly and with more volatility than experienced adults in
3s Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115.
36 Id.
31 See Planned Parenthood of Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), Ohio v. Akron
Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990), H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398
(1981) (upholding statutes requiring parental consent before a minor undergoes
an abortion).
38 Ogloff, supra note 33, at 449.
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felonious situations.
B. The Goals of Punishment
While the dual penological goals, retribution and deterrence,
may theoretically be effective when the death penalty is applied to
adults, it is wrong to sweepingly assume these goals are met when
the death penalty is applied to juveniles. The egocentrism of
juveniles, coupled with a sense of immortality, and society's special
place for children within the legal system, negates the realization of
retribution and deterrence in the application of the death penalty to
juveniles.
According to the Court in Gregg, capital punishment must
serve a legitimate penological goal of either retribution or
deterrence.39 Retribution, or vengeance, is the oldest and most
elemental theory of punishment. 4 Its purpose is to vent society's
outrage and need for revenge. One commentator stated that "even
if the execution of an adult.., is permissible this justification loses
its appeal when the object of that righteous vengeance is a child."41
Because children are not fully mature in judgment and control,
juvenile executions provide shallow satisfaction of society's need
for retribution.42
Deterrence may be either specific or general. Specific
deterrence is a mechanism by which the offender is disabled from
committing future crimes.43 While the death penalty is the ultimate
form of specific deterrence, juvenile murderers have a very low
39 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183.
4 Ogloff, supra note 33, at 454.
41 VICTOR L. STaEm, DEATH PENALTY FOR JuvEmIEs 35 (1987).
4 Steven M. Scott, Evolving Standards of Decency and the Death Penalty for
Juvenile Offenders, 19 CAP. U. L. Rev. 851, 865 (1990).
41 Ogloff, supra note 33, at 453.
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recidivism rate when released from long-term imprisonment.' Any
need for the juvenile death penalty is thereby negated by the
comparable specific deterrent effect of long-term imprisonment.
General deterrence seeks to inhibit others in society from
committing similar crimes for fear of incurring the same
punishment.45 This premise may be true for society generally, but
cannot be assumed for juvenile offenders as a group because of their
underdeveloped thought processes.
C. Goals of Juvenile Justice
Juvenile justice, arising from the Progressive Movement at
the turn of the century, is based on the principles of rehabilitation
of the juvenile and protection of society through the use of non-
punitive, treatment-oriented sanctions. 46 The foundation of the
juvenile justice system is to protect and rehabilitate juvenile
offenders. This is accomplished by balancing the best interest of
the child against the needs of society.47 Rehabilitation recognizes
the uniqueness of children. It also recognizes that children lack fully
developed thinking and judgment processes and should be given an
opportunity to learn to become responsible adults.4" While
rehabilitation has historically been thought of as best for the child,
the death penalty rejects the concept of rehabilitation.
Public sentiment has shifted away from policies of
rehabilitation as juvenile crime has become more violent and the
offenders younger. This is apparent in the waiver system, whereby
'4 Streib, supra note 41, at 37.
'5 Ogloff, supra note 33 at 454.
4 Suzanne D. Strater, The Juvenile Death Penalty: In the Best Interests of the
Child?, 26 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 147, 162 (1995).
47 Id. at 163.
I See May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953).
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juvenile offenders may be transferred to adult criminal court, and
tried and punished as adults. 49 The age of waiver varies among
states, but all rest on the concept that the more serious the crime the
child commits, the more mentally capable the child is to be
presumed. Capital punishment of juvenile offenders, therefore,
rejects the principals of one hundred years of juvenile justice, and
the principals of rehabilitation.
D. The State as Parens Patriae and Executioner
Children's interests are considered and balanced against
societal interests in all areas of the law, except when the child
commits a capital crime." For example, the Wisconsin Children's
Code is clear in its intent: the "best interest of the child shall always
be of paramount consideration." 5 As parens patriae the state is
required to protect children and consider their "best interest".
The state has the power to act in loco parentis for the
purpose of protecting the child because the child is presumed unable
to care for him or herself. Through parens patriae, the child is
subject to state control in addition to parental control.52 This
doctrine is the foundation in all areas of law relating to children.53
It is contradictory when the parental state is called upon to
execute its own children. When the state executes juvenile
offenders, -it fails in its role as parens patriae. It is difficult to
explain to a juvenile that a death sentence is in his or-her best
interest. Clearly the question becomes how a humane society, which
promotes the welfare and rehabilitation of children one moment,
I EWING, supra note 1, at 114.
50 Id. at 168.
s5 WIs. STAT. ANN. § 48.01(2) (West 1987 & Supp. 1994).
52 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
" Strater, supra note 46, at 162.
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would be willing to execute the same child the next.5 4 The paradox
lies in the fact that state legislatures enact laws protecting children
and also laws legalizing the execution of children.
E. Public Opinion
The Supreme Court, in determining the constitutionality of
the death penalty, looks to the acts of state legislatures as measures
of public opinion. Although the Court in Stanford rejected the
determination of sentencing juries as objective indicia measuring the
evolving standards of decency, legislatures are free to examine
these sentences in assessing public opinion."
Between 1984 and 1993, not one state enacted a death
penalty for juvenile offenders despite the 1989 Stanford decision.
In fact, the years 1985 through 1995 saw eight states raise their
minimum death sentencing age or abolish the juvenile death penalty
altogether.56 In 1994 and 1995, Kansas and New York,
respectively, passed death penalty laws; however, both states refuse
to execute juvenile offenders, setting a minimum age at eighteen."
Although twenty-five states allow for capital sentencing of
juveniles, very few juries choose to do so. From 1973 through
1992, 114 juveniles received a death sentence.58 Between 1964 and
1985, the United States did not execute anyone for crimes
54 Id. at 172.
11 See Thompson, 487 U.S. 815; Stanford, 492 U.S. 361.
56 Scott, supra note 42, at 860. The breakdown is as follows: age raised to
seventeen (one state), eighteen (six states), banned (one state).
57 STATE OF WIs. REFERENCE BUREAu Bull., supra note 2, at 25.
58 Ved P. Nanda, The United States Reservation to the Ban on the Death Penalty
for Juvenile Offenders: An Appraisal Under the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, 42 DEPAuL L. REv. 1311, 1312-13 (1993).
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committed as a minor. 9 This reluctance to sentence or execute
minors is consistent with the findings of a recent research study
exploring community sentiment about the juvenile death penalty.'
Recently, the Florida Supreme Court held the death penalty,
as applied to a person who was fifteen years of age when
committing the crime in question, unconstitutional, because it
vi6lated the "cruel or unusual punishment" clause in the State
constitution," Florida's statute sets no sentencing minimum age,
and the court appears unwilling to push the envelope and test the
Thompson decision.
Under Stanford, the Supreme Court turned to state
legislatures for assessing public opinion regarding capital
punishment as applied to juvenile offenders. Yet the court failed to
look to public opinion, embodied in all areas of juvenile law in
order to clearly perceive public sentiment regarding juveniles.
When measured by the lack of juvenile death penalty acts in
the last ten years, the jurors' reluctance to utilize the juvenile death
penalty, and public sentiment embodied in other areas of juvenile
law, public opinion weighs against the execution of juveniles and
indicates the need for overturning current juvenile death penalty
legislation.
59 Id. at 1319.
1 Norman J. Finkel et al., Killing Kids: The Juvenile Death Penalty and
Community Sentiment, 12 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 5, 8-9 (1994). This study utilized
subjects identified through voir dire as death qualified subjects to determine
whether jurors would be willing to give the death sentence on a case-by-case
basis. Three fact patterns similar to Thompson, Enmund, and Wilkins v. Missouri
were distributed to the subjects, along with jury instructions and capital
sentencing instructions. Two experiments varying the age and severity of the
crime found it highly improbably that, under any circumstance, juries would
sentence an offender under age eighteen. Id. at 18-19.
61 Allen v. State, 636 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 1994) (per curiam).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Dependence on the juvenile death penalty as part of the
answer to increasing juvenile homicides only delays the search for
an acceptable means of reducing violent juvenile crime.6' Although
constitutionally permissible, the practice benefits neither the
juvenile nor society. The juvenile death penalty has been tried
sufficiently long enough in American history to be found wanting.
The necessary legislative considerations taken individually
may or may not persuade against the enactment of the juvenile death
penalty. Considered as a totality, however, these considerations
strengthen the premise that the juvenile death penalty must be
rejected by state legislatures, even in the face of rising juvenile
homicide rates. Though appealing to "tough on crime" politicians
and citizens, the juvenile death penalty is a short-sighted placebo to
a deeply rooted complex problem.
62 Victor L. Streib, Excluding Juveniles from New York's Impendent Death
Penalty, 54 ALB. L. REv. 625, 677 (1990).
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